This article shows that the Syrian Arab Republic (SAR) was doomed for destruction by the «collective West» at least since 2002 within the framework of the process of fragmentation of the states of the Greater Middle East and bringing the Muslim Brotherhood to power in these countries. Later this process was called the Arab Spring. The analysis of the alleged «facts» of the use of chemical weapons by the Syrian Armed Forces made it possible to establish that they were nothing more than primitive artificial performances. No «chemical attack» in Syria, attributed to the Syrian army, pursued military objectives. The basic principles of the use of chemical weapons in combat were ignored. Not a single case of the use of factory­loaded chemical munitions has been recorded. Information attacks of the Western media and non­governmental organizations, as well as their claims about the «Asad's regime»'s «chemical war against its own people» were carried out to support the Syrian anti­governmental forces at the time of their offensive on the government­controlled territory, or when they were defeated by the Syrian army. Since 2013 the opposition has been practicing mass abductions and murders of children in order to obtain more convincing «pictures». But these crimes did not attract any attention of the Western governments or human rights organizations. The article also presents the evidence of systemic failures and shortcomings in the work of the OPCW ­ UN Joint Investigative Mechanism (JIM) and the OPCW Fact Finding Mission (FFM), formed to establish the facts surrounding allegations of the use of toxic chemicals for hostile purposes in Syria. Considering staged fake chemical attack in Syria within the context of modern geopolitics, we can assume that it is possible to talk about the new «crusade» on Russia and its allies, but with the use of weapons of mass destruction. After the retrospective analysis of the mechanisms of information warfare, we may also note the deep intellectual degradation of its organizers in comparison with the similar information operations of the 1990s. This circumstance poses a serious threat not only to Syria and Russia, but to other countries as well, because the organizers of these operations are unable to assess even the immediate impacts of their actions.

The relevance of the development and the improvement of methods for the determination of metabolites (biomarkers) of toxic substances in biological fluids (blood, urine, etc.) is associated with the need to establish facts of humans and animals exposure to toxic chemicals. The need for such analysis arises within the framework of monitoring of the compliance with the provisions of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), when conducting investigations into the alleged use of chemical agents, as well as within the framework of the official proficiency tests carried out by the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW). Nowadays there exists the problem of the determination of low­molecular­weight mustard gas biomarkers in biological samples with the use of gas chromatography methods with mass­selective detection. The lowmolecular­weight biomarkers of sulfur mustard (SM) are thiodiglycol, oxides and sulfoxides. The identification and quantitative assessment of SM markers in blood and urine is carried out according to the methods, based on the displacement of thiodiglycol and its derivatives from protein conjugates with titanium trichloride, solidphase extraction, concentration in ethyl acetate solution, derivatization with pentafluorobenzoyl chloride, heptafluorobutyrylimidazole, heptafluorobutyric acid anhydride or chloride, subsequent stripping of the derivative into the appropriate solvent and GH­MS analysis (chemical ionization technique with methane as a reagent gas with the registration of negative ions). After the sample preparation, the limits of detection of the minimum values of ultra­low concentrations of the analyzed biomarkers of SM in urine and blood plasma were determined. After the chromatographic analysis, the corresponding graphs of indicators have been constructed, based on the concentrations of biomarkers in urine and blood plasma. Later on they have been used for the elaboration of the methods for the determination of SM biomarkers in human urine and blood.

The article is dedicated to the activities of the Mobile diagnostic group (MDG) of the Federal State Budgetary Establishment «27 Scientific Centre» of the Ministry of Defence of the Russian Federation. It provides the information about the MDG`s structure and tasks. In particular, the article describes the personnel`s actions in planning and conducting NBC reconnaissance operations at the territory of the Kuril Islands chain and the Crimean Peninsula, as well as in the examination of objects, where large numbers of people and VIPs might be expected, for the presence of toxic substances and sources of ionizing radiation. The information, necessary for the prediction of the situation in the area of security measures, has been received. The article shows that the experience, gained by the MDG experts since the moment of the group`s formation, allows them to carry out their tasks successfully in the context of growth and constant changes in modern NBC challenges and threats.

The appearance of flamethrowers as weapons is an example of the sagacity of lone individuals in the development of military equipment. Prior to World War I the German engineer Richard Fiedler invented the workable specimens of portable backpack (light) flamethrowers, trench (heavy) flamethrower, automatic igniters to flamethrowers, telescopic automatic flamethrower and other inventions, related to flamethrowing technology. Fiedler managed to reach the gunreach of jet flamethrowers to the distances that are difficult to cover even today, and also to substantiate the tactical methods of their application. Fiedler's flamethrowers were successfully tested in Russia and in Germany in 1909–1910. Using the financial interest of Fiedler, the specialists of the Chief Engineering Directorate of the Russian Military Ministry reached an agreement with him for the purchase of the latest model of the backpack flamethrower, compositions of fire mixtures for various purposes, and certain details of flamethrowers, which he kept secret as his «know­how». However, this line was closed in Russia in 1911 by the Military Minister V.A. Sukhomlinov and his assistant A.A. Polivanov on formal grounds. Fiedler's inventions were not scrutinized by the military establishment of Great Britain and France at all. The opportunity to acquire a new type of weapons was missed for Russia and Entente Powers from the very beginning. The main reason for the indifferent attitude towards flamethrowers in the prewar period was the false ideas about the future war as a maneuverable and quick. The patents for technical solutions beyond the scope of «general ideas» about the means of warfare were also underestimated. But later they became harbingers of the emergence of new directions for the creation of weapons. It is important to take this fact into account while choosing the most promising directions for the creation of military equipment. In Germany, after almost a decade of tests and doubts, Fiedler's flamethrowers were accepted for service and delivered to pioneer detachments in 1912. They were improved and used effectively throughout the war. The Allies were to make their own flamethrowers themselves in the course of war, hastily, mainly from German models. There is no reliable information about the inventor`s fate after 1912.