Efficiency and Relevance of Verificatory Events Conducted by Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (Modern Period). Insights in History of VEREX and AHG

Highlights

- VEREX experts’ panels (1991–1993) and Ad Hoc group (AHG) (1994–2001) were created to work out a legally binding document (the so-called Protocol) to Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction. Their activity was stipulated by the necessity to take some steps to strengthen biological weapons non-proliferation regime;

- The Protocol was blocked by the USA in 2001, however, nowadays there is a necessity to use some of its articles and guidelines to verify Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention.

Relevance. Caused by the unreliability of international control over the spread of biological weapons, the emergence of new biological weapons of destruction of people and types of biological weapons.

Purpose of the study is to analyze the current state of things in terms of BTWC, and to find ways to update and improve previous research methodological tools for BTWC verification.

Study base sources. The authors have analyzed the sources, available in PubMed, Google Scholar, UN, National Electronic Library (Russia) databases.

Method. Analytical method has been employed.

Results. The studies have proved that the unified text of BTWC check protocol, prepared by Ad Hoc group contains a number of statements and practical guidelines that could be implemented by state-parties taking into account modern political, scientific, and technological circumstances. Moreover, if we return to the Act of the year 1994 with further discussion of the possibility to create a verification procedure, this will strengthen BTWC and boost its institutional capacity.

Conclusion. Practical efficiency of measures proposed by VEREX and AHG experts give state parties some reasons for conducting a detailed analysis of possible consequences of implementation of these measures in modern circumstances and for discussion of possible update of existing tools during the meeting of working group on BTWC strengthening during upcoming 10th review conference for state parties.

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